Book Review: Shorting the Grid
Where is our country headed, according to Meredith Angwin? Blackouts, lots of blackouts.
This book is eye-opening! Through 2020, I had spent my whole career in upstream oil and gas and wind (i.e. extraction); I had a limited knowledge of midstream (i.e. how you transport energy). Until recently, when I launched a bitcoin mining company, I hadn’t had any reason to learn power generation (i.e. electricity and distribution). This book is packed with so much wisdom that it is not possible to distill it down. Instead of such a futile attempt, I instead chose to try and break down some of the biggest ah-has that fell upon me. I highly recommend anyone wondering about electricity and how it all works actually read the full book. Thankfully for us all, Angwin is very witty and cracks some great jokes (including a Star Wars reference), which made her work a complete joy to read.
Two Worlds: Vertically-Integrated Utilities and Regional Transmission Organizations
In Angwin’s view, the world is bifurcated into two epochs. The first is the vertically-integrated utility era.
Prior to the RTOs of the 1990s, vertically integrated utilities were responsible for power generation, transmission, and distribution. Questar Corporation, now Dominion, in Utah is a good example of a vertically integrated utility area that’s survived and not joined a RTO. If Questar spent CAPEX, it would be guaranteed a 20% IRR on its investment, regardless of it was necessary or not. This led to inefficient spending by the utility of course. However, it also resulted in a well-built (if not overbuilt) power grid complete with abundant power generation assets, transmission, and distribution. In the pre-RTO model, reliability was a feature.
The second is the post-1990s “deregulation” era that birthed RTOs (Regional Transmission Organizations) and ISOs (Independent System Operator) - which are essentially RTOs. The logic of the time was deregulation worked for telephones and airlines, so it must work for electricity too. As states began to opt-in, something unexpected occurred - reliability became a bug and possibly and anti-feature.
In the post-RTO world, no entity - not the RTO/ISO, FERC, power plants, utilities, capacity markets, nor the State itself - was responsible for reliability. Not even the famously named (and increasingly unstable) Electricity RELIABILITY Council of Texas (ERCOT) is responsible for reliability. Now, citizens of both California and Texas are rushing to purchase diesel generators to backup their increasingly unstable grid systems.
In this sense, the “ratepayer” is still the correct term to use because “customers” would have the ability to choose their power and providers. The result of Angwins research regarding RTO areas vs. non-RTO areas is that electricity is MORE EXPENSIVE in RTO areas than if they were in the vertically integrated monopoly.
Come to find out Angwin’s conclusions regarding RTO vs. Non-RTO area prices are similar to my unexpected conclusion regarding mandated (RPS) grid emission targets vs. non-mandated (RES) grid emission targets.
I’m honored that she enjoyed my research. She also notes in her book a study from the University of Chicago that concluded the same.
Liar Loans
In 2008, the credit market had little oversight and people who had no business qualifying for home loans were getting them with ease. “Liar loans”, as they were called, were common. The borrowers weren’t asked to provide documentation, their credit wasn’t checked, and there were no down payments. In the old days, mortgages would only be given to a surgeon with a sizable down payment, high income, and high credit rating. Contrasting liar loans that led to the sub-prime mortgage crisis to healthy loans is a great analogue to what’s been happening to our grids.
“A varied grid meant that, if one fuel had shortages or rose in price, the grid would still be stable, and cost would remain relatively stable.” In the post-RTO world, none of these things matter; the RTO grid is like Liar Loans. Reliable power can’t make a profit; utilities are leaving RTO areas; and power installations are now only able to operate intermittently. Pre-RTO, regulatory bodies wanted to see reliable power plants and power plants that were able to use several different types of fuels.
How the Grid is Powered
Come to find out, the power plants powering our grids do not make profits by doing their jobs (generating power) in a RTO. This statement applies to all fuels - oil, coal, natural gas (single and combined cycle), wind, and solar. They require capacity, ancillary, and government subsidies (PTC/REC).
Nuclear is the closest to generating a profit by selling electricity (kWh). Natural Gas (and to the extent oil is used, oil) relies upon capacity markets. Meanwhile, wind (and solar) require Production Tax Credits (PTCs) and Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) in order to get there. This matters.
Capacity Markets
How do these markets work? Here’s how it works.
In a way, natural gas is winning the capacity market game. In another way, it’s renewables who are bidding negative (they pay the RTO to take their electricity) who are winning the capacity markets because they make their windfalls by selling RECs and receiving PTCs. In Texas and California, the situation is much direr.
The lack of capacity payments in ERCOT and CAISO has led to the increasingly deteriorated status of formerly reliable power plants (coal, oil, nuclear, natural gas). These states have meanwhile over-incentivized wind and solar forcing these formerly reliable power plants to generate intermittently because wind and solar generate intermittently. These systems are crumbling before our eyes.
Plants that were built to run 24/7 and efficiently, like combined cycle natural gas plants, are being ditched in favor less desirable and higher cost single cycle “peaker” plants.
PTCs & RECs
Warren Buffet’s comments on wind in 2014 have come home to roost. Now, Texas, California, and Oklahoma have built about 50,000 MWs of wind turbines.
Wind and Solar developers were paid by the government to build them, and now they are being paid by the government to operate them.
RECs and PTCs do not get paid unless they generate electricity. Historically, PTCs were equal to 2.4 cents per kWh (when Oklahoma’s retail electricity power price was about 6 cents per kWh). Under the newly replenished PTC program under Biden’s, analysis suggests that the all-in credit is going to be raised to 3.1 cents per kWh.
RECs are how all these companies claim they are “100% renewable”, a fraud that John Oliver has wakened to.
In the case of Vermont, they were double-booking their RECs.
Thus, wind and solar power plants are able to make 3.1 cents per kWh from the newly passed IRA’s PTCs and an additional 1-6.75 cents per kWH from selling (and double-selling) their RECs to states with mandated renewable targets like those posted to PJM EIS - all while bidding negative into the capacity markets and financially harming reliable power plants.
Wind and Solar Cost More
As Angwin notes, while putting downward pricing pressure on clearing price sounds like it’s good for the consumer, it is not.
Some of the reason for this is due to compliance costs for renewable portfolio standards (RPS).
In other states, where it is legal, some of it is due to net metering:
Some of the reason is due to curtailment cost.
Some of it is due to redundancy costs:
Then there are transmission costs:
I’d like to note that none of these costs are included in Lazard’s Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) for wind or solar power generation (which many renewable advocates like to use to suggest wind and solar are cheaper than reliable generation like natural gas and nuclear).
Capacity Factor vs. Capacity Value
This is a massive distinction that needs attention. Lazard’s LCOE calculation uses capacity factor. That is, under perfect conditions (abundant sunshine and abundant wind) how much of the total capacity could be used in a given timeframe. Wind’s capacity factors range from 26% to 52%. Utility-scale solar ranges between 16% and 30%. However, that’s not how it works in the real world. In the real world, Angwin coins the term Capacity Value (I chose to coin a synonym for it, Value Factor). That is, can it actually generate when called upon?
So, if a market needed 1,000 megawatts of baseload, it would have to build a 1,885-megawatt wind farm at a cost of $3.303 billion. Then, that 1,885 MW wind farm would have to be backed up with 1,114 MW of inefficient single-cycle “peaker” plants (more efficient combined cycle built to run 24/7 and with lower emissions can’t backup intermittency easily) at a cost of $753 million. So, the total cost for 1,000 MW of demand in a market is $4 billion (and that doesn’t count transmission or distribution; that’s just for power plants). And the wind and solar players are playing the game well.
Plug 11.5% into Lazard’s LCOE calculation instead of 45% and the outcome is drastically different.
The Miracle That is the Grid
This concept of near-instant balancing is nothing short of miraculous; Balancing Authorities are the closest thing to wizards that exist in our world today.
This means if grid demand is 1,000 megawatts, the supply must be exactly 1,000 megawatts and in real-time! Now, imagine a wind farm stops generating because the wind stops blowing or a solar farm stops generating because of clouds or snow or other mechanical failures. The Balancing Authority, or grid operator, must replace that unplanned and lost generation within milliseconds or risk area-wide blackouts!
Reliable fuels - thermal fuels like coal, oil, nuclear, and natural gas - operate just that way, reliably. They generate what’s called “grid inertia”, turning a massive rod that will keep generating power even if the thermal source fails. When the power source fails, that rod keeps spinning (generating electricity) for as long as fifteen minutes, unlike wind and solar which cease immediately and unexpectedly. Thermal fuels give the BA time to balance the grid where renewables (wind/solar) do not.
Before you go and shout, yes, but grid storage! Grid storage technology is wishful thinking.
The Backwardation of New England Power
New England seems predisposed to megacity ignorance, as I outline in a baby-viral thread. They eagerly ban pipelines that could help ease the cost of their electricity as well as reduce their risk of blackout. It doesn’t help that New York, which banned fracking and also eagerly prevents new pipeline projects, sits between New England and the Marcellus Shale. The result is that New England burns OIL, YES OIL!, for electricity.
As Angwin, a native of Vermont, recounts:
So, because New England (and New York) refuses to allow pipelines, their grid operator (via The Winter Reliability Program) pays to store and burn oil for electricity. Oil produces 2.13 pounds of carbon dioxide (CO2) per kilowatt-hour (kWh) - that is marginally better than coal which produces 2.23 pounds CO2/kWh and far worse than natural gas which only produces 0.91 pounds CO2/kWh. As if that’s not enough, New England is purchasing its natural gas for $27 per thousand cubic feet (mcf) while EQT is selling gas in Appalachia for $7 per mcf. During winter storms, when demand soars, the differential is even worse.
It’s yet to be determined in New England citizens want these draconian laws or if they have simply remained in the dark regarding these complex issues.
The Fuel Storage Problem
Some of New England (and other RTO grids) problems of reliability are easily resolved too, if it weren’t for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
Basically, FERC insists that RTOs (ISOs) be “fuel neutral". So anything that smacks of “buy this fuel” is not allowed. In essence, since wind can’t store the wind, solar can’t store the sun, and natural gas is not easily stored on-site, FERC says it would be unfair to incentivize oil, coal, and nuclear with on-site storage. As Angwin is revealing, this FERC policy is anti-reliability. Even with the oil stored by the grid operator under the Winter Reliability Program, New England nearly ran out.
An addition from yours truly:
Due to the Jones Act, a 1920 law which prohibits ships built and registered outside the U.S. from delivering goods between American ports, no United States LNG is allowed to come into New England from the Gulf Coast. There are no LNG carriers flying an American Flag. In fact, I believe there is only one ship in the world that flies the American flag. So, in order to get US LNG from Louisiana to New England, it requires first going to London and then from London to New England to get around the Jones Act. This results in Russian LNG being shipped to New England to help save the day. It also incentivizes oil shipments from less than desirable locations, too.
Over-Reliance Upon Natural Gas is Risky
Angwin makes a strong case that FERC needs to reverse its “fuel neutral” stance and instead directly incentivize on-site storage. Without this kind of incentive, we are at-risk of “just in time” natural gas delivery.
Prior to reading and appreciating this book, I held a particularly ignorant view about coal.
After reading this book, and becoming more informed about grid reliability and electricity generation, it’s apparent and obvious that we still need our coal plants. Coal was one of the central saviors of the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) during Winter Storm Uri (I’m from Oklahoma and part of the SPP, an RTO). Coal is easily stored and the coal plants are already built. Similar to the nuclear fuel crisis in France, and the energy crisis in Germany, we must not mothball our coal plants if we desire our lights to remain on. As mentioned already, in the post-RTO world we have gone from an overbuilt generation market to a market at-risk of not having enough generation to meet demand (hence warnings that MISO, CAISO, ERCOT, and even the SPP are at-risk of blackouts this coming winter).
What I failed to appreciate was how hard it is to store natural gas. And since grids have to be balanced in milliseconds, and since wind and solar are reliably unreliable, we are compounding risk upon risk. Crossing our fingers that existing natural gas pipelines will deliver enough natural gas just in time, while residential customers take priority out of the pipeline (reducing gas supplies to the power plants), is not a strategy. It’s a failure to plan and will lead to senseless, unnecessary deaths.
Transmission and FERC Order 1000
There are more problems with wind and solar too. They are placed where there are not enough transmission lines exist to carry the power across the country to where grid demand exists. Enter FERC Order 1000.
After FERC 1000, the costs of public-policy transmission lines will be socialized between states. If a state wants a transmission line built, not for reliability as assessed by ISO-NE but for public policy, as defined by the state, then other states will pay most of the cost of that line. FERC left the rates to be determined by the various states.
In New England, the state that wants the line for policy reasons will pay 30% of the cost of the transmission line, while other states will share 70% of the costs. (Different RTOs can set their own rules for FERC 1000 socialization.)
If your New England state wants a transmission line to bring power from distant wind turbines to its city center, in the pre-FERC 1000 days, that would be something the ratepayers of that state would pay for. After FERC 1000, one state may decide on a policy, but all states will pay for it.
Federal policies can affect renewables. As noted in a previous section, the federal government, through FERC 1000, allows states to force their neighboring states to pay for the state-level policy choices. This is taxation without representation: the people in the neighboring states don’t get to elect the people who set the policy, but the people in the neighboring states have to pay for the policy.
And what should be expected from such policy? A dramatic increase in transmission costs.
What We Have to Look Forward To?
For his important new book, A Question of Power: Electricity and the Wealth of Nations,230 Robert Bryce visited Beirut and spoke with people there. They referred to the electricity “brokers” as the “electricity Mafia.” They paid two electricity bills each month: one for about $35 to the state-owned power company, for the power they could provide, which was available about six hours a day. Then they pay around $100 a month to their local “mafia” generator. Bryce asked one man why he didn’t just buy his own generator, since he was paying his neighbor a significant amount of money. The answer was that, if he broke away from the local “mafia” generator, he might be killed. At the very least, the wire to his generator would be cut. Bryce reports how a clash between two generator-owners left two people dead and required the Lebanese army to end the violence.
Other Important Departing Highlights:
As I described in the chapter on the Balancing Authority, when the sun goes down and there is a lot of solar on the grid, other power plants must ramp up very quickly. This rapid-ramping “neck” of the duck curve is energy inefficient. Think of how much gas your car will burn if you speed away from a stoplight as if you were in a race, compared to how much it will burn if you are cruising down the highway at a steady clip. It’s the same with a gas turbine.
Malhotra calculates that providing 100 hours of backup for a single massive (1000 MW) coal plant would require 32,000 tons of lithium. In 2018, the global production of lithium was 62,000 tons.
Nickel-iron batteries use nickel and iron, which are not in tight supply. However, nickel-iron batteries need to be charged with about a third more electricity than they are able to deliver at discharge. In other words, while these batteries are not as resource intensive for the battery itself, they are resource intensive in terms of the power that they require. They lose charge at the rate of about 20% per month, whereas lithium batteries lose charge at 2% per month.
Warren Buffet on wind: I will do anything that is basically covered by the law to reduce Berkshire’s tax rate. For example, on wind energy, we get a tax credit if we built a lot of wind farms. That’s the only reason to build them. They don’t make sense without the tax credit.”
it isn’t a “market” if you can’t charge more if you take more risk.
some types of power plants get extra payments, which usually have nothing to do with the role of the plant on the grid. These payments are called “out-of-market” payments, and they are usually set by state policies.
PG&E eventually admitted that the [smart] meters they had installed in Bakersfield malfunctioned when they got too warm.
And there you have it. I am a great believer in taking personal responsibility, but I found her remarks discouraging. Too many people have the idea that their personal actions are paramount and that nothing else matters. It’s a kind of hubris: I will take these actions, and I will make the difference for climate. Well, no. Even if everybody in Germany decided to lower their electricity use, insulate their homes, use LED lights, and so forth, Germany would still miss its climate goals.
Jacobson did drop his lawsuit, which should be a happy ending, I suppose. However, many people, including myself, feel that the fact that Jacobson even brought a lawsuit has had a chilling effect on the whole renewable-energy debate. If scientists can’t debate each other in peer-reviewed journals without fear of lawsuits, science will not be able to move forward very well. There are two books directly refuting the Jacobson plan. Roadmap to Nowhere: The Myth of Powering the Nation With Renewable Energy by Mike Conley and Tim Maloney is available as a free PDF download on the web.
Finally:
Around 2015, Greenpeace decided to put their money where their mouth was and provided a poor village in the Bihar region of India with solar panels and battery backup. I believe the plan behind this Greenpeace experiment was to show that their stand against fossil-fuel usage was not the same as a plan to deny electricity to poor people. It didn’t quite work out the way Greenpeace wanted it to work out. After spending $400,000 on the installation, they invited the former Prime Minister of the state of Bihar for the inauguration of the system. He was greeted by villagers who had lined up to protest: “We want real electricity, not fake electricity!”
“Real” electricity comes from the grid, and the grid electricity in that part of India comes from coal. The first morning after the system was installed, the batteries were drained overnight. One young man had hoped to study in the early morning before he had to go to work in the fields. He discovered that his lights would not go on in the early morning. “We want real electricity!” People want the lights to go on. The title of Gayathri Vaidyanathan’s article in Scientific American says it all: “Coal Trumps Solar in India.” If wealthy people feel that they need to encourage very poor people not to use coal—well, those wealthy people are going to have a problem. I would recommend that they watch Hans Rosling’s wonderful video “The Magic Washing Machine,” about the different types of energy poverty.